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Abstract
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics As in Allen
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1. Introduction
The banking system has traditionally been vulnerable to the problem of bank runs, in which
many or all depositors at a bank attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously. If these
withdrawals at a particular bank then spread across banks in the same region or country
they may generate a banking panic. These financial crises are costly and are prevented with
different intervention measures.
Banking panics were common in the US and Europe prior to the 20th century. Suspension
of convertibility or central bank intervention were the usual tools to deal with panics.
However, most of the regulatory systems that prevailed in the US and Europe until the
1980s, evolved as a consequence of the financial crisis of the 1930s.1 The Great Depression
(1929–1933) had an important impact on the financial system of the US2 and led to the
creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This institution insured deposits up
to $2500. Deposit insurance3 was an excellent measure to eliminate runs and there was a
calmer period after World War II. However, the market induced desintermediation of the
1970s, in the face of inflation and nominal rigid interest rate ceilings, and the Banking
Directives in Europe generated a deregulation of the banking systems in the US and Europe
in the 1980s. The experience with bank deregulation has not been entirely pleasant. Many US
Savings and Loans failed in the 1980s and some European countries have also experienced
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problems in the 1990s. Furthermore, many emerging countries have had severe problems
in their banking systems in recent years. All this has led to a rethinking of the framework
of banking regulation.
Theoretical research on banking theory has focused on analyzing the microeconomic role
of banks in the economy (e.g. Bryant [1980], Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Bhattacharya
and Gale [1987], Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988], Chari and Jagannathan [1988], and
Allen and Gale [1998]). This stream of research has approached banking panics through
two different types of models.
First, the models of pure panic runs comprise those models in which bank runs occur
as random phenomena, with no correlation with other economic variables. Bryant [1980],
followed by Diamond and Dybvig [1983], made a significant contribution by modeling the
demand for liquidity and the transformation service provided by banks. They demonstrated
that demand deposit contracts, which enable the transformation of illiquid assets into more
liquid liabilities, provide a rationale both for the existence of banks and for their vulner-
ability to runs. The optimal contract yields a higher level of consumption for those who
withdraw early than the technological return. Bank runs, thus, take place when the idea of
deposit withdrawals spills over economic agents (an essential point is that banks satisfy a
sequential service constraint, see Wallace [1988]). The model concludes that with no aggre-
gate uncertainty, a suspension of convertibility policy eliminates the bank run equilibrium.
Otherwise, a deposit insurance policy would be more effective. Diamond and Dybvig’s
model attracted severe criticisms (e.g., Gorton [1988]) for assuming that bank runs are
random phenomena, and thus, uncorrelated with other economic variables. Gorton [1988],
in an empirical study of bank runs in the US during the National Banking Era (1863–1913),
found support for the notion that bank runs tended to occur after business cycle peaks.
Second, models of information-induced runs assert that bank runs occur due to the diffu-
sion of negative information among depositors about a bank’s solvency, and therefore are
not the result of sunspots. These type of models is consistent with the business cycle view of
the origin of panics (e.g., Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988], Chari and Jagannathan [1988],
and Allen and Gale [1998] among others). Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988] examined the
relative degrees of risk-sharing provided by bank deposit and traded equity contracts. They
focused on the relationship between the riskness of and information on the stream of returns,
and the desirability of equity versus deposit contracts. They found that deposit contracts
tended to the better for financing low risk assets. Chari and Jagannathan [1988] drew on
both information-induced and pure panic runs models4 to study the effects of extra market
constraints, such as suspension of convertibility on bank runs. They concluded that such
constraints prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations. Despite the importance of
this contribution, it raised considerable criticisms due to: (i) the ambiguous role of banks or
any other financial intermediary in the model, (ii) assuming that individuals were risk neu-
tral. An interesting addition to this literature is the recent paper by Allen and Gale [1998].
In constrast to previous literature,5 which has focused mainly on modeling bank runs, this
paper analyzes the optimal intervention policy that should be implemented, if any, to deal
with panics. As in Diamond and Dybvig, individuals have corner preferences, that is, at date
1, agents have realized utility for date 1 or date 2 consumption only. However, in this model
the bank invests in a risky technology and individuals receive information about returns at
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date 1. Bad information has then the power to precipitate a crisis. The paper shows that
under certain circumstances, bank runs can achieve the first best outcome, as they allow
efficient risk sharing among depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios.
This result seems to contradict the traditional history of regulation, based on the premise
that banking panics are bad and should be eliminated. However, if there are liquidation costs
or markets for risky assets are introduced, laissez-faire is no longer optimal, and central
bank intervention is needed to achieve the first best.
In the present paper it will be shown that even if there are no liquidation costs, a laissez-
faire policy is not optimal, provided individuals’ preferences are smooth. The model pre-
sented here is consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics. As in
Allen and Gale [1998], banks operate in a competitive environment and so they offer deposit
contracts that maximize the expected utility of the consumers. The behavior of the banking
industry is thus represented by an optimal risk sharing problem. The paper considers two
different risk sharing problems: it is first assumed that banks can write contracts where the
amounts individuals withdraw at each date can be made contingent on the return on the risky
asset. This problem provides a benchmark for optimal risk sharing. Secondly, and in line
with Allen and Gale’s paper, we consider a standard contract, which offers individuals fixed
payments at each date, and which is therefore by definition “non contingent”. In this second
case, bank runs arise endogenously as a result of the negative signal which is observed by
some depositors in the interim period. However, the key difference with Allen and Gale
[1998] is that in this paper individuals’ preferences are describable as s ooth, that is, at
date 1 agents derive utility for consumption in both periods of their lives (although type-1
agents derive relatively more utility for consumption in period 1 than type-2 agents). 6 This
framework allows for total bank runs, as opposed to Allen and Gale [1998] where runs were
always partial. In their case, as type-1 agents derive only utility for consumption at date 1,
being the only type-2 to stay the course would give the investor infinite returns when the
long-term asset return is close to zero. By contrast, in this model, as both types of agents
consume in the two periods, the lone type-2 simply obtains a somewhat larger share of a
very small pie. Type-2 agents are then better off by running on the bank. However, if all
type-2 agents run, they would consume too much at date 1 relatively to the first best. The
bank can then restrict payments at date 1 if the bank’s return is very low, and this will reduce
the amount of first period cash that type-2 individuals obtain by imitating type-1s to the
point to which they are willing to follow the type-2 plan.
The contribution of the present paper is in this sense to show that Allen and Gale’s result
about the optimality of bank runs depends on individuals’ preferences. In a more general
framework, considered in the present work, standard contracts and bank runs can never
achieve the first best outcome, unless payments are restricted at date 1. This result supports
the traditional view that bank runs are costly and should be prevented with regulation.
The structure of the paper is as follows: The basic framework of the model is presented in
Section 2. As mentioned above the behavior of the banking industry is characterized by the
optimal, incentive compatible risk sharing problem. Two different risk sharing problems are
considered. In Subsection 2.1 we assume that the optimal allocation can be made contingent
on the return on the risky asset, and is considered as the benchmark case. In Subsection 2.2
we consider the case in which banks offer standard contracts, that are not contingent on
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the return on the risky asset. However, individuals can observe this return and make their
withdrawal decision conditional on it. It is shown that when individuals’ preferences are
smooth, standard contracts and bank runs can never achieve optimal risk sharing unless a
suspension of payments policy is implemented. Finally, Section 3 concludes the paper.
2. The model
There is an economy going through a sequence of three periods (T = 0, 1, 2) and one
good per period. There are two types of assets: a safe asset and a risky one. The safe asset
transforms one unit of the consumption good at T into one unit of the consumption good at
T +1. It can be thought of as a storage technology. The risky asset transforms one unit of the
consumption good at T = 0 into ˜R units of the consumption good at T = 2, and where ˜R
is a nonnegative random variable with a probability density function f (R). For simplicity,
it is assumed that the long-term technology cannot be liquidated early, or equivalently, no
costs for early withdrawals are assumed.
On the household side of the economy there is a continuum of ex-ante identical agents,
who are endowed with k0 units of the good at T = 0 and that maximize expected utility of
consumption. They are subject at T = 1 to a privately observed uninsurable risk of being of
either of two types. They can be of type-1 with probability t1 or of type-2 with probability
t2. The difference between types is that type-1 agents derive relatively more utility from
consumption in the first period with respect to type-2 agents. The following form for the
utility function is assumed:
U j (c1 j , c2 j , ρ j ) = ρ j ln c1 j + (1 − ρ j ) ln c2 j (1)
where j = type = 1, 2. For simplicity, the following values for the parameter ρ j will be
considered: ρ1 = ρ > 0.5, ρ2 = 1 − ρ < 0.5 and 0 ≤ ρ2 ≤ ρ1 ≤ 1. Note that Allen and
Gale’s results can simply be derived as extreme cases corresponding to ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = 0.
At T = 1 depositors observe a signal, which predicts with perfect accuracy the value of
R that will be realized at date 2.
It is finally assumed no aggregate uncertainty so that with probability 1 a fraction t1 of
consumers are of type-1 and a fraction t2 of type-2 and also the expected return is greater
than one (E[R] > 1), that is, the risky asset is more productive than the safe one.
The following notation will be used throughout the paper:
µ = 1 − ρ
ρ
, t1m = t1 + t2µ1 + µ , t2m =
t2 + t1µ
1 + µ (2)
and where 0 < µ < 1 and t1m + t2m = t1 + t2 = 1.
2.1. The optimal incentive-compatible risk sharing problem
As a benchmark case, it is first assumed that banks can write contracts where the amount
that is withdrawn at each date can be made contingent on the random return ( ˜R). The
deposit contract can be represented by the functions c1 j (R),c2 j (R)(i = 1, 2), which specify
consumption at dates 1 and 2 for a type j consumer.
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The optimal risk sharing problem can be written as follows:
max
ci j ,k1,k2
{
E ˜R
[
t1U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + t2U 2(c12(R), c22(R), ρ2)
]} (3)
s.t. k1 + k2 ≤ k0
t1c11(R) + t2c12(R) ≤ k1 (4)
t1[c21(R) + c11(R)] + t2[c22(R) + c12(R)] ≤ k1 + k2 R
U j (c1 j (R), c2 j (R), ρ j ) ≥ [U j (δ j c1i (R), (1 − δ j )c1i (R) + c2i (R), ρ j )] (5)
for i = j ; i, j = 1, 2; 0 ≤ δ j ≤ 1
where c1 j (R) represents consumption at time T = 1 for a type j agent, c2 j (R) consumption
at time T = 2 for a type j agent, k1 is the investment in the safe asset at T = 0 and k2 is
the investment in the risky asset at T = 0. The first constraint states that the total amount
invested must be less or equal to the amount deposited. The second constraint says that the
investment in the safe asset should be enough to cover consumption at date 1. The third one
represents the fact that the investment in the risky asset plus the amount of the safe one that
is left over from period one should be enough to cover consumption at date 2, that is:7
t1c21(R) + t2c22(R) ≤ k2 R + [k1 − t1c11(R) − t2c12(R)] (6)
The last two constraints are incentive compatibility constraints. In the case of a type-
2 agent, incentive compatibility requires that the utility obtained from the consumption
bundle the individual receives if he is honest (c12(R), c22(R)), should be at least as large
as the utility obtained by lying and behaving like a type-1 agent, that is, obtaining the
consumption bundle (c11(R), c21(R)) and then reinvesting his first period consumption in
the storage technology in the optimal way for him. This means consuming δ2c11(R) in the
first period and (1 − δ2)c11(R) + c21(R) in the second period. The same for type-1 agents.8
However, in solving the optimal risk sharing problem, the incentive compatibility con-
straints can be dispensed with.9 The problem is solved subject to the three constraints and
it can be shown that the incentive constraints are always satisfied. The following result is
obtained:
Theorem 1: The solution [k1, k2, ci j (R)], to the optimal risk sharing problem is charac-
terized by the following conditions:
if r ≤ 1 (case 1)
c11(R) = c22(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m]
(7)
c21(R) = c12(R) = µc11(R)
if r > 1 (case 2)
c11(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
c12(R) = µc11(R)
(8)
c22(R) = rc11(R) c21(R) = µc22(R)
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and k1, k2, the values that maximize the following expression:
max
k1,k2
[ ∫ 1
0
U ∗(1) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
+
∫ ∞
1
U ∗(2) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
]
(9)
s.t. k1 + k2 = k0 (10)
where U∗(1) and U∗(2) are the utility functions corresponding to the cases r ≤ 1 and r > 1
respectively, and where the random variable r ( from now on, the specific return) is defined
as follow:
r = R (k2/k1)(t2m/t1m) (11)
Proof. See Appendix B for a detailed resolution of the problem.
An example of the optimal contract is illustrated in figure 1.10 As long as r ≤ 1, the
optimal allocation implies storing part of of the liquid asset to date 2 in order to compensate
the low returns on the risky asset in this period. When the signal indicates that R will be high
at date 2 (i.e r > 1), then the liquid asset is completely exhausted for date 1 consumption,
since consumption at date 2 will be high in any case. In case 1, first and second period
consumption depend on R. In case 2, first period consumption is constant and second
period consumption depends on R. For the parameter values of the example, the optimal
levels of the initial investments are k∗1 = 0.52 and k∗2 = 0.48 and the expected utility achieved
is −0.3757.
2.2. Optimal risk-sharing through deposit contracts with bank runs
Following Allen and Gale [1998], we now consider the situation in which banks are restricted
to use standard contracts, as observed in practice.
In particular, let a demand deposit contract be defined as a contract that requires an initial
investment at T = 0 with the intermediary in exchange for the right to withdraw per unit
of initial investment (at the discretion of depositor and conditional on the bank’s solvency)
either c¯11 units in period 1 and c21(R) units in period 2 or c¯12 units in period 1 and c22(R) units
in period 2. As shown by Jacklin [1987], the demand deposit contract optimally combines
the two types of deposits that banks usually hold, a time deposit and a more typical demand
deposit contract.11 The standard demand deposit contract is by definition “non-contingent”.
The reason the contractual deposit payoffs in the interim period can not depend on R is
because information about this future random return is not verifiable (even though some
have it). It is based on an assumption of private information about the bank’s asset returns,
which makes for the inflexibility in the deposit contract terms.12 In this sense the only risk
the depositors bear is that they will not be repaid their money in the situation in which it is
physically impossible to repay them.
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Figure 1. Optimal consumption levels in the first best allocation.
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That is, at T = 0 or ex-ante period, individuals deposit their k0 units of endowment in
the bank and are offered a menu of contracts, where they receive a fixed payment at date 1
and a random one at date 2. The second period random payment will depend on the random
return ˜R. This uncertain second period return reflects the fact that having invested in a risky
asset the bank may not be able to make its promised payments at date 2. In this situation,
when the bank is restricted to use a standard contract, bank runs will become a possibility.
It will be denoted by 0 ≤ α(R) ≤ t2 the fraction of type-2 agents that choose to run, or
equivalently, that demand the type-1 contract when the value of R becomes sufficiently
small (that is, when their incentive compatibility constraint is no longer satisfied). Let α(R)
be defined as follows:
α(R)


= 0 if (1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln [δ2c11(R)]
+ ρ ln [(1 − δ2)c11(R) + c21(R)]
> 0 otherwise
(12)
Whenever a run occurs all available funds will be divided pro rata in proportion to claims
(as in Allen and Gale [1998], we do not assume a sequential service constraint).
The bank chooses a portfolio k1, k2, the consumption functions c1 j (R), c2 j (R)( j = 1, 2),
the deposit parameters c¯1 j , c¯2 j and the withdrawal function α(R) that maximizes the fol-
lowing expression:
max
{
E ˜R
[
t1U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + t2U 2(c12(R), c22(R), ρ2)
]} (13)
s.t. k1 + k2 ≤ k0 (a)
[t1 + α(R)]c11(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c12(R) ≤ k1 (b)
[t1 + α(R)](c21(R) + c11(R)) + [t2 − α(R)][c22(R) + c12(R)] (c)
≤ k1 + k2 R
∀ 0 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln [δ2c11(R)]
+ ρ ln [(1 − δ2)c11(R) + c21(R)] (d)
∀ 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1
ρ ln c11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c21(R)
≥ ρ ln [δ1c12(R)] + (1 − ρ) ln [(1 − δ1)c12(R) + c22(R)] (e)
if 0 < α(R) < t2
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R)
= (1 − ρ) ln [δ2c11(R)] + ρ ln [(1 − δ2)c11(R) + c21(R)] (f)
if c11(R) < c11
[t1 + α(R)]c11(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c12(R) ≤ k1 (g)
c1 j (R) ≤ c1 j (h)
0 ≤ α(R) ≤ t2 (i)
(14)
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Constraints (a) to (e) are familiar. Constraint (a) states that the total amount invested
must be less or equal to the amount deposited. Constraint (b) says that the investment in
the safe asset should be enough to cover consumption at date 1. The constraint takes into
account the fact that some type-2 agents may choose to run, that is, to demand the type-1
contract. Whenever there is a run, type-1 depositors will not be able to receive their promised
payment (c11) and so their final consumption (c11(R)) will depend on the proportion of
type-2 depositors that choose to run. This means that c11(R) = c11 if α(R) = 0, and c11(R) <
c11 otherwise. Constraint (c) states that the investment in the risky asset plus the amount
of the safe one that is left over from period one should be enough to cover consumption at
date 2. Similarly, the constraint takes into account the fact that type-2 agents may choose to
run. Constraints (d) and (e) are the incentive compatibility constraints.13 Finally, constraints
(f) and (g) deserve some explanation. As mentioned above, the bank offers individuals a
fixed payment at date 1 and a random one at date 2. If this random second period return is
sufficiently high, the contract is incentive compatible, that is, type-2 agents always prefer
their allocation to the possibility of receiving the type-1 allocation and using the storage
technology. However, there is a critical value of R,14 below which the contract is no longer
incentive compatible and some or all type-2 agents will decide to run on the bank. These
withdrawals will stop when the utility of the two groups is equated or equivalently, when the
incentive compatibility constraint for type-2 agents is restored (constraint (f)). Whenever
there are runs, and therefore type-1 agents cannot receive their promised payment at date 1
(c11), the bank “may”15 exhaust the liquid asset among depositors: type-1 and some type-2
that demand the type-1 contract (and are treated on an equal basis) and other type-2 that
demand their promised payment at date 1. However, in some cases the bank will find it
optimal to suspend payments (that is, not exhaust the liquid asset when runs occur). This is
represented by constraint (g).
It is implicitly assumed that those type-2 agents that demand the type-1 contract can use
the storage technology, and smooth consumption in the optimal way for them, and so in
equilibrium their consumption will be the same as the rest of the type-2 agents.
The solution to the bank’s problem defined above is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The solution [k1, k2, c1 j , c1 j (R), c2 j (R), α(R)]( j = 1, 2), to the bank’s prob-
lem is characterized by the following conditions:
Demand deposit contract
c11 = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
c12 = µc11
(15)
c22(R) = rc11 c21(R) = µc22(R)
if r ≤ r1 = µ t1mt2m (case 3):
c11(R) = c22(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m]
c21(R) = c12(R) = µ1 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m] (16)
α(R) = t2
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if r1 < r < 1 (case 2):
c11(R) = c22(R) = k1
t1 + α(R) + (t2 − α(R))µ
c12(R) = c21(R) = µc11(R) (17)
α(R) = 1
2
1 + µ
1 − µ
[
t2m − t1m + t1m − t2mr
t1m + t2mr
]
< t2
if r ≥ 1 (case 1):
c11(R) = c11 c12(R) = c12
c22(R) = rc11 c21(R) = rc22 (18)
α(R) = 0
and k1, k2, the values that maximize the following expression:
max
k1,k2
[ ∫ r1
0
U ∗(1) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
+
∫ 1
r1
U ∗(2) f (r ) dr t1m
t2m
k1
k2
+
∫ ∞
1
U ∗(3) f (r ) dr t1m
t2m
k1
k2
]
(19)
s.t k1 + k2 = k0 (20)
Proof. See Appendix C for a detailed resolution of the problem.
As mentioned above, the bank offers individuals a standard contract, where they receive
a fixed payment at date 1 and a random one at date 2. This contract corresponds to case 2
of Theorem 1 and it is incentive compatible as long as r ≥ 1. Therefore for values of r ≥ 1
there are no bank runs and individuals will consume what was planned ex-ante by the bank.
The consumption levels are given by case 1 of Theorem 2. For values of r < 1 there are
partial or total bank runs and the consumption levels are those given by cases 2 and 3 of
Theorem 2.
The optimal consumption levels are illustrated in figure 2, for the parameter values of
the example. It can be observed that for values of r ≤ r1 = 0.66 bank runs involve all type
2 agents, and the consumption levels are those given by case 3 of Theorem 2. It should be
mentioned that in the case in which there are total bank runs the bank does not exhaust the
liquid asset among depositors.
For 0.66 < r < 1, bank runs will be partial and the consumption levels are those given
by case 2. Finally, when r ≥ 1, there are no bank runs and individuals will consume what
was planned by the bank, as given by case 1.
If we compare the optimal consumption functions for the two problems, it can be seen that
both solutions coincide. However, in order to implement the optimal solution, the bank must
restrict payments at date 1, when the long term return is very bad. This result is expressed
by the following theorem:
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Figure 2. Optimal consumption levels with the standard contract.
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Theorem 3: Assuming the support of R contains zero, then a banking system subject to
runs cannot achieve first-best efficiency using a standard contract unless a suspension of
convertibility policy is adopted.
Proof. As mentioned above, the bank offers individuals a standard contract which cannot
be made contingent on the risky return. For values of the specific return higher or equal
to one (r ≥ 1), the contract is incentive compatible and there are no runs (α(R) = 0). In
this case, the consumption functions coincide with those obtained in the first best case
(case 2 of Theorem 1). For values of the specific return r1 < r < 1, the contract is no longer
incentive compatible and there would be partial bank runs, involving only a fraction of
type-2 consumers (0 < α(R) < t2). It can be shown that substituting this value α(R), in the
expression for c11(R) corresponding to this case, it is obtained that c11(R) = 11+µ k1t1m [t1m +
r t2m] and again these consumption functions coincide with the ones obtained in the first best
case (case 1 of Theorem 1). Finally, for very low values of the specific return, r ≤ r1, all
type-2 agents will decide to run on the bank (α(R) = t2). In this case, the bank can implement
the first best allocation by suspending payments at date 1. This is the main difference with
respect to Allen and Gale’s results. In their case, due to the corner preference assumption,
bank runs were always partial. As long as there is a positive value of the risky asset, there
must be a positive fraction of late consumers who wait until the last period, (p. 1259).16
In the numerical example the optimal levels of the initial investments are k∗1 = 0.52 and
k∗2 = 0.48 and the expected utility achieved with a standard contract is −0.3757.
The above result shows that Theorem 2 of Allen and Gale’s paper is not robust, and
therefore, it provides a rationale for banking regulation. In this sense, a suspension of con-
vertibility policy, that restricts payments at date 1, would implement the first-best. Payments
in the first period would be restricted to a level of ¯k < k1, where ¯k = 11+µ k1t1m [t1m + r t2m].17
3. Concluding remarks
The motivation of this paper has been to show that Allen and Gale’s result is not robust:
In Theorem 2 of their paper they show that a standard demand deposit contract, which will
lead to bank runs in some states of the world, achieves optimal risk sharing. However, if
there are liquidation costs or markets for risky assets are introduced, then bank runs are no
longer optimal. Allen and Gale consider a particular characterization of preferences, where
the so called type-1 depositors derive only utility for consumption in period 1 and type-2
depositors derive utility for consumption in period 2. This paper extends the above model by
considering a more general, and realistic, preference structure, in which individuals derive
utility for consumption in both periods of their lives, although type-1 agents derive relatively
more utility for consumption in period 1 with respect to type-2 agents. It is shown that in
this more general framework, even if there are no liquidation costs, standard contracts and
bank runs can never achieve the first best outcome, unless a suspension of convertibility
policy is implemented.
The more general preference structure considered in the present work allows for total
bank runs and this is the main difference with respect to Allen and Gale’s model, where bank
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runs were always partial. In their case, as type-1 agents received nothing at date 2, being the
only type-2 to stay the course would give the investor infinite returns when the long-term
asset return is close to zero. By contrast, in this model, as type-1 agents are supposed to
receive some cash at date 2, the lone type-2 simply obtains a somewhat larger share of a
very small pie. Type-2 agents are then better off by running on the bank. However, if all
type-2 agents run, they would consume too much at date 1 relatively to the first best. The
bank can then suspend convertibility if the bank’s return is very low, and this will reduce
the amount of first period cash that type-2 individuals obtain by imitating type-1s to the
point to which they are willing to follow the type-2 plan.
The contribution of the paper is in this sense to show that there are no positive aspects to
a crisis, that is, bank runs are always costly and should be prevented with regulation.
Appendix A: Incentive compatibility constraints
In the optimal incentive risk-sharing problem defined in Subsection 2.1, it is assumed
that the realization of the timing of the consumption needs is private information of the
consumer. Given this information asymmetry, an allocation can only be implemented if it
is incentive compatible, that is, if it gives no consumer an incentive to lie or deviate about
what he actually wants to consume. In the case of a type 2 agent, incentive compatibility
requires that the utility obtained from the consumption bundle he receives if he is honest
(c12(R), c22(R)), should be at least as large as the utility obtained by lying and behaving
like a type 1 agent, that is, obtaining the consumption bundle (c11(R), c21(R)) and then
reinvesting his first period consumption in the storage technology in the optimal way for
him. If he reinvested part of his first period allocation (c11(R)) in this storage technology, his
optimal consumption levels in both periods c∗21 (R), c∗22 (R) are the solution to the following
problem:
max
c1(R)·c2(R)
{(1 − ρ) ln c1(R) + ρ ln c2(R)} (21)
s.t. c1(R) ≤ c11(R) (22)
c2(R) = (c11(R) − c1(R)) + c21(R)
which yields:
(a) c∗21 (R) = c11(R) c∗22 (R) = c22(R) if µ > c11(R)c21(R)
(b) c∗1µ1 (R) = (c11(R)+c21(R))µ1+µ c∗22 (R) = c11(R)+c21(R)1+µ if µ ≤ c11(R)c21(R)
(23)
The incentive compatibility constraint for a type-2 agent is then:
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln c∗21 (R) + ρ ln c∗22 (R) (24)
The incentive compatibility constraint for a type-1 agent is obtained in a similar way, and
would be:
ρ ln c11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c21(R) ≥ ρ ln c∗11 (R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗12 (R) (25)
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where
(a) c∗11 (R) = c12(R) c∗12 (R) = c22(R) if µ < c22(R)c12(R)
(b) c∗11 (R) = c12(R)+c22(R)1+µ c∗12 (R) = (c12(R)+c22(R))µ1+µ if µ ≥ c22(R)c12(R)
(26)
Appendix B: Optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing problem
The first best allocation is obtained as a solution to the following problem:
max
ci j ,k1k2
{
E ˜R
[
t1U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + t2U 2(c12(R), c22(R), ρ2)
]} (27)
s.t. k1 + k2 ≤ k0
t1c11(R) + t2c12(R) ≤ k1 (28)
t1[c21(R) + c11(R)] + t2[c22(R) + c12(R)] ≤ k1 + k2 R
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln c∗21 (R) + ρ ln c∗22 (R) (29)
ρ ln c11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c21(R) ≥ ρ ln c∗11 (R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗12 (R)
and where c∗ ji , (i, j = 1, 2) were defined in the previous section. However, in solving the
optimal risk-sharing problem the incentive compatibility constraints can be dispensed with.
The problem is solved subject to the three constraints and it can be shown that the first-best
solution is always incentive compatible. For each value of R the consumption levels ci j (R)
solve the problem:
max
ci j ,k1k2
{
E ˜R
[
t1U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + t2U 2(c12(R), c22(R), ρ2)
]} (30)
s.t. t1c11(R) + t2c12(R) ≤ k1
t1[c21(R) + c11(R)] + t2[c22(R) + c12(R)] ≤ k1 + k2 R (31)
The Lagrangian is formed by using the lagrangian multipliers λ1 and λ2 of the first two
resource constraints.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
t1ρ 1c11(R) − λ1t1 − t1λ2 = 0 if c11(R) > 0 (a)
t1(1 − ρ) 1c21(R) − t1λ2 = 0 if c21(R) > 0 (b)
t2(1 − ρ) 1c12(R) − λ1t2 − t2λ2 = 0 if c12(R) > 0 (c)
t2ρ 1c22(R) − t2λ2 = 0 if c22(R) > 0 (d)
k1 − t1c11(R) − t2c12(R) = 0 if λ1 > 0 (e)
k1 + k2 R − t1[c11(R) + c21(R)] − t2[c12(R)
+ c22(R)] = 0 if λ2 > 0 (f)
(32)
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Let
µ = 1 − ρ
ρ
; t1m = t1 + t2µ1 + µ ; t2m =
t2 + t1µ
1 + µ (33)
and
r = R (k2/k1)(t2m/t1m) (34)
This random variable r is essential in defining the ex ante risk-sharing problem.
The following cases may be considered:
Case 1: (λ1 = 0)
From Eqs. (32a) and (32c):
c12(R) = µc11(R) (35)
From Eqs. (32b) and (32d):
c21(R) = µc22(R) (36)
From Eqs. (32a) and (32d):
c11(R) = c22(R) (37)
Substituting Eqs. (35)–(37) in Eq. (32f) the value of c∗11(R) is obtained. The optimal solution
to this problem is then:
c∗11(R) = c∗22(R) =
1
1 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m]
(38)
c∗21(R) = c∗12(R) = µc∗11(R)
In this case it is assumed that λ1 = 0, or equivalently:
t1c
∗
11(R) + t2c∗12(R) ≤ k1 (39)
Substituting c∗11(R) and c∗12(R) in the above expression, the following condition for this
case to hold is obtained, that is, t1m + r t2m ≤ 1 or equivalently r ≤ 1.
Case 2: (λ1 > 0)
From Eqs. (32a) and (32c):
c12(R) = µc11(R) (40)
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From Eqs. (32b) and (32d):
c21(R) = µc22(R) (41)
Substituting Eq. (40) in (32e), the value of c∗11(R) is obtained.
Substituting Eq. (41) in (32f), the value of c∗22(R) is obtained.
The optimal solution is then:
c11(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
c12(R) = µc11(R)
(42)
c22(R) = rc11(R) c21(R) = µc22(R)
In this case it is assumed λ1 > 0, from [a] and [b]:
λ1 = ρ 1
c∗11(R)
− (1 − ρ) 1
c∗11(R)
> 0 (43)
Substituting the optimal consumption levels in the above expression we would obtain
that this case holds for r > 1.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the optimal solution is incentive compatible.
Case 1 (r ≤ 1): The incentive constraints are those given by Eqs. (24) and (25), where
c
∗ j
i (R)(i, j = 1, 2) correspond to those given by Eqs. (23b) and (26a).18
The incentive constraint for type-2 agents is then:
(1 − ρ) ln c∗12(R) + ρ ln c∗22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln µc∗11(R) + ρ ln c∗11(R) (44)
or equivalently, substituting the optimal consumption levels in the above equation:
ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µ ≥ ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µ (45)
The incentive constraint for type-1 agents is:
ρ ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗21(R) ≥ ρ ln µc∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗11(R) (46)
or equivalently,
ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µ ≥ ln c∗11(R) + ρ ln µ (47)
i.e.
(1 − ρ) ≤ ρ (48)
And so in case 1 the optimal allocation is always incentive compatible.
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Case 2 (r > 1): The incentive compatibility constraints are again (24) and (25). In this
case, c
∗ j
i correspond to those given by Eq. (23a) if r > 1/µ2 and (23b) if r ≤ 1/µ2 and
(26a).19
The incentive constraint for type-2 agents, with (23a):
(1 − ρ) ln c∗12(R) + ρ ln c∗22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln c∗11(R) + ρ ln µrc∗11(R) (49)
substituting the optimal consumption levels in this case we obtain:
(1 − ρ) ln µc∗11(R) + ρ ln rc∗11(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln c∗11(R) + ρ ln µrc∗11(R) (50)
or equivalently,
ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µ + ρ ln r ≥ ln c∗11(R) + ρ ln µr (51)
i.e.
1 − ρ ≤ ρ (52)
The incentive constraint for type-2 agents, with (23b) is:
(1 − ρ) ln c∗12(R) + ρ ln c∗22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln
1 + µr
1 + µ µc
∗
11(R) + ρ ln
1 + µr
1 + µ c
∗
11(R)
(53)
substituting the optimal consumption levels in the above equation we obtain:
(1 − ρ) ln µc∗11(R) + ρ ln rc∗11(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln
1 + µr
1 + µ µc
∗
11(R) + ρ ln
1 + µr
1 + µ c
∗
11(R)
(54)
or equivalently,
ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µ + ρ ln r ≥ (1 − ρ) ln µ + ln
1 + µr
1 + µ + ln c
∗
11(R) (55)
i.e.
rρ ≥ 1 + µr
1 + µ (56)
The above inequality is strictly satisfied if r = 1 and is completely fulfilled for r > 1.
This implies that r should be ≥1.
Finally, the incentive constraint for type-1 agents:
ρ ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗21(R) ≥ ρ ln µc∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln rc∗11(R) (57)
or equivalently,
ρ ln c∗11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln µrc∗11(R) ≥ ln c∗11(R) + ρ ln µ + (1 − ρ) ln r (58)
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i.e.
(1 − ρ) ≤ ρ (59)
In a second step the values k1, k2, are obtained by maximizing the following expression:
max
k1,k2
{ ∫ 1
0
U ∗(1) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
+
∫ ∞
1
U ∗(2) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
}
(60)
s.t. k1 + k2 = k0 (61)
where U ∗(1) and U ∗(2) are the utility functions corresponding to the cases r ≤ 1 and r > 1
respectively.
Appendix C: Optimal risk-sharing through deposit contracts with bank runs
The bank chooses a portfolio k1, k2, the consumption functions c1 j (R), c2 j (R)( j = 1, 2),
the demand deposit contract and the withdrawal function α(R) that maximizes the following
expression:
max
{
E ˜R
[
t1U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + t2U 2(c12(R), c22(R), ρ2)
]} (62)
s.t. k1 + k2 ≤ k0 (a)
[t1 + α(R)]c11(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c12(R) ≤ k1 (b)
[t1 + α(R)](c21(R) + c11(R)) + [t2 − α(R)][c22(R) + c12(R)]
≤ k1 + k2 R (c)
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R) ≥ (1 − ρ) ln c∗21 (R) + ρ ln c∗22 (R) (d)
ρ ln c11(R) + (1 − ρ) ln c21(R) ≥ ρ ln c∗11 (R) + (1 − ρ) ln c∗12 (R) (e)
if α(R) > 0
(1 − ρ) ln c12(R) + ρ ln c22(R)
= (1 − ρ) ln c∗21 (R) + ρ ln c∗22 (R) (f)
if c11(R) < c11
[t1 + α(R)]c11(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c12(R) ≤ k1 (g)
c1 j (R) ≤ c1 j (h)
0 ≤ α(R) ≤ t2 (i)
(63)
and where c∗ ji , (i, j = 1, 2) were defined in Appendix A.
We solve the problem by parts:
(i) if there are no bank runs, that is, α(R) = 0, the individuals would consume what was
planned ex ante by the bank. In this case, ci j (R) = ci j and c2 j (R) = c2 j (R) ( j = 1, 2). The
demand deposit contract is obtained by maximizing the expected utility of depositors subject
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to the following constraints:
t1c11 + t2c12 = k1 (64)
t1c21(R) + t2c22(R) = k2 R
and incentive compatibility (constraints (63d) and (63e)).
This problem corresponds to the one given by case 2 in Appendix B, with solution:
c11(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
c12(R) = µc11(R)
(65)
c22(R) = rc11(R) c21(R) = µc22(R)
We know that this solutions is incentive compatible for type-2 agents as long as r ≥ 1, and
therefore if r ≥ 1 individuals consume what planned by the bank and therefore α(R) = 0.
(ii) Partial bank runs: If r1 < r < 1, there will be partial bank runs, as some type-2 agents
will claim the type-1 contract. As mentioned in the text, whenever there are runs, and
type-1 individuals cannot receive their promised payment c¯11, the bank exhausts the liquid
asset among depositors. This is represented by constraint (g). Also, these withdrawals will
stop when the incentive compatibility constraint of type-2 agents is restored again. This
is represented by constraint (f). Consumption of individuals in each period would then be
obtained by maximizing the expected utility (62) subject to the constraints:
[t1 + α(R)]c11(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c12(R) = k1 (66)
[t1 + α(R)]c21(R) + [t2 − α(R)]c22(R) = k2 R
and incentive compatibility constraints (63e) and (63f).20
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
t1 1c11(R) + λ1(t1 + α(R)) − λ3
1+µ
c11(R)+c21(R) = 0 if c11(R) > 0 (a)
t1µ 1c21(R) + λ2(t1 + α(R)) − λ3
1+µ
c11(R)+c21(R) = 0 if c21(R) > 0 (b)
t2µ 1c12(R) + λ1(t2 − α) + λ3
µ
c12
= 0 if c12(R) > 0 (c)
t2 1c22(R) + (t2 − α(R))λ2 + λ3 1c22(R) = 0 if c22(R) > 0 (d)
λ1((c11(R) − c12(R)) + λ2((c21(R) − c22(R) = 0 if α(R) > 0 (e)
(t1 + α(R))c11(R) + (t2 − α(R))c12(R) − k1 = 0 if λ1 > 0 (f)
(t1 + α(R))c21(R) + (t2 − α(R))c22(R) − k1 − k2 R = 0 if λ2 > 0 (g)
µ ln c12(R) + ln c22(R) − µ ln
[ (c11(R)+c21(R))µ
1+µ
]
− ln [ (c11(R)+c21(R))1+µ ] = 0 if λ3 > 0 (h)
(67)
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From Eqs. (67a) and (67c):
t1
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R)
− t2
t2 − α(R)
µ
c12(R)
− λ3
[
1 + µ
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R) + c21(R) +
µ
t2 − α
1
c12(R)
]
= 0 (68)
From Eqs. (67b) and (67d):
t2
t2 − α(R)
1
c22(R)
− t1
t1 + α(R)
µ
c21(R)
+ λ3
[
1 + µ
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R) + c21(R) +
1
t2 − α
1
c22(R)
]
= 0 (69)
Eliminating λ3 from the above equations:[
t1
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R)
− t2
t2 − α(R)
µ
c12(R)
]
×
[
1 + µ
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R) + c21(R) +
1
t2 − α(R)
1
c22(R)
]
+
[
t2
t2 − α(R)
1
c22(R)
− t1
t1 + α(R)
µ
c21(R)
]
×
[
1 + µ
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R) + c21(R) +
µ
t2 − α(R)
1
c12(R)
]
= 0 (70)
From Eqs. (67a) and (67b):
t1
t1 + α(R)
[
1
c11(R)
− µ
c21(R)
]
+ λ1 − λ2 = 0 (71)
From Eqs. (67c) and (67d):
λ1c12(R) − λ2µc22(R) = 0 (72)
Equations (71), (72) and (67e) imply:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
c11 − c12 c21 − c22 0
1 −1 t1t1+α
[ 1
c11
− µ
c21
]
c12 −µc22 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (73)
with solution:[
1
c11(R)
− µ
c21(R)
]
{[c11(R) − c12(R)]µc22(R) + c12(R)[c21(R) − c22(R)}] = 0
(74)
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Two possibilities may be considered:
c21 = µc11 (75)
(c11(R) − c12(R))µc22(R) + c12(R)(c21(R) − c22(R)) = 0 (76)
(a) c21 = µc11
The following change of variables will be adopted: c1(R) = c12(R)c11 R and c2(R) =
c21(R)
c22(R) .
Equations (67f)–(67h), and (70), would become:
c11(R) = k1
t1 + α(R) + (t2 − α(R))c1(R) (77)
c22(R) = k2 R(t1 + α(R))c2(R) + t2 − α(R) (78)
c1(R)µc22(R) = c11(R)µµ (79)[
t1
t1 + α(R) −
t2
t2 − α(R)
µ
c1(R)
][
1
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R)
+ 1
t2 − α(R)
1
c22(R)
]
+
[
t2
t2 − α(R)
1
c22(R)
− 1
t1 + α(R)
1
c11(R)
][
1
t1 + α(R) +
µ
t2 − α(R)
1
c1(R)
]
= 0
(80)
On the other hand, taking into account Eqs. (77)–(80) can be rewritten as follows:
c1(R)µr t2m
t1m
[
t1 + α + (t2 − α)c1(R)
(t1 + α(R))c2(R) + t2 − α
]
= µµ (81)
[
t1
t1 + α(R) −
t2
t2 − α(R)
µ
c1(R)
][
1
k1
t1 + α(R) + (t2 − α(R))c1(R)
t1 + α(R)
+ 1
k2 R
(t1 + α(R))c2(R) + t2 − α(R)
t2 − α(R)
]
+
[
t2
t2 − α(R)
(t1 + α(R))c2(R) + t2 − α(R)
k2 R
− t1
t1 + α(R)
t1 + α(R) + (t2 − α(R))c1(R)
k1
][
1
t1 + α(R) +
µ
t2 − α(R)
1
c1(R)
]
= 0
(82)
Let a = t2−α(R)t1+α(R) . Equations (81) and (82) can be rewritten as follows:[
t1 − t2µ
ac1(R)
][
1 + ac1(R)
k1
+ 1
k2 R
(
1 + c2(R)
a
)]
+
[
1 + µ 1
ac1(R)
][
t2
k2 R
(
c2(R)
a
+ 1
)
− t1
k1
(1 + ac1(R))
]
= 0 (83)
c1(R)µr t2m
t1m
[
1 + ac1(R)
c2(R) + a
]
= µµ (84)
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or equivalently, the value of a from the above equation is:
a =
c1(R)µr t2mt1m − c2µµ
µµ − r t2mt1m c1(R)1+µ
(85)
Finally from Eq. (79) and the relationship c21 = µc11 it is obtained:
c2(R) = c1(R)
µ
µµ−1
(86)
Equations (85) and (86) can be substituted in Eq. (83), in order to have a non linear
equation in c1(R).
It can be easily verified that the solution to the non linear equation yields c1(R) = µ.
From Eq. (86) the value of c2(R) is also obtained, that is, c2(R) = µ.
c1(R) = µ = c12c11 or equivalently c12 = µc11. On the other hand c21 = µc12. This implies
that c21 = c12.
c2(R) = µ = c21c22 or equivalently c21 = µc22. This also implies that c22 = c11.
The value of α(R) is obtained from the expression: a = t2−α(R)t1+α(R) . That is, α(R) =
t2−at1
1+a .
Given that c1(R) = c2(R) = µ, the value of a in Eq. (85) is expressed as follows:
a =
r t2mt1m
− µ
1 − µr t2mt1m
(87)
Substituting the value of a given by Eq. (87) in the above expression for α(R) it is obtained:
α(R) = 1
2
1 + µ
1 − µ
[
t2m − t1m + t1m − t2mr
t1m + t2mr
]
< t2 (88)
From Eq. (77) the value of c11 was:
c11(R) = k1
t1 + α(R) + (t2 − α(R))c1(R) (89)
or equivalently,
c11(R) = k1(1 + a)1 + aµ (90)
Substituting the value of a given by Eq. (87) in the above expression it is obtained:
c11(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m] (91)
and c22(R) = c11(R), c12(R) = c21(R) = µc11(R)
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This solution coincides with the first best solution (Case 1) given by Eq. (42). Therefore
the other possibility given by Eq. (76) does not have to be considered.
In this case it is assumed that 0 < α(R) < t2. This means that if α = t2−at11+a = t2, there
are total bank runs and all type 2 agents will claim the type-1 contract. This will occur when
a = 0, or substituting the value of a given by Eq. (87) when r = µ t1mt2m = r1.21(iii) If r ≤ r1 all agents will run on the bank (α(R) = t2) and so in this case the constraints
would become:
c11(R) ≤ k1 (92)
c11(R) + c21(R) ≤ k1 + k2 R
that with the incentive compatibility constraints (63d) and (63e) yield the optimal solution
in this case:
c11(R) = c22(R) = 11 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m]
(93)
c21(R) = c12(R) = µ1 + µ
k1
t1m
[t1m + r t2m]
as in the first best case.
In this case, the bank does not exhaust the liquid asset and so the suspension level would
be ¯k = 11+µ k1t1m [t1m + r t2m].
In a second step, the optimal levels of the initial investments (k1, k2) are the values that
maximize the following expression:
max
k1,k2
{∫ r1
0
U ∗(1) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
+
∫ 1
r1
U ∗(2) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
+
∫ ∞
1
U ∗(3) f (r ) dr t2m
t1m
k1
k2
}
(94)
s.t. k1 + k2 = k0 (95)
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Notes
1. See Samartı´n [1997] for a detailed description of bank regulation in the US and Europe in the 20th century.
2. From 1930 to 1933 the number of bank failures in the US averaged over 2000 per year (see Miskhin [1995]).
3. It should be noticed that most deposit insurance systems in Europe were created in 1970s.
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4. In the model, panics runs may occur due to the fact that uninformed individuals condition their beliefs about
the bank’s long-term technology on the size of the withdrawal queue at the bank. If this size is large (due to a
high liquidity shock only) they may nevertheless infer sufficiently adverse information to precipitate a bank
run.
5. Another exception is Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] or a few other references mentioned in Allen and Gale
[1998].
6. Allen and Gale [1998] follow the Diamond and Dybvig [1983] specification of preferences, in which indi-
viduals derive utility for consumption either in period 1 or period 2. However, as Jacklin [1987] has noted,
this assumption on preferences has the feature that banks and equity contracts are equivalent risk sharing
instruments, and therefore this rules out a positive role for a financial intermediary in the economy.
7. Notice that if the safe asset is completely exhausted for date 1 consumption the second and third constraints
would become: t1c11(R) + t2c12(R) = k1 and t1c21(R) + t2c22(R) = k2 R, respectively.
8. The incentive compatibility constraints are derived in more detail in Appendix A.
9. Logarithmic additive utility functions are shown to have the feature that the first best allocation is always
incentive compatible. As described in Appendix B, Case 1 of Theorem 1 is always incentive compatible and
Case 2 is incentive compatible as long as r = R (k2/k1)(t2m/t1m ) ≥ 1.
10. In the numerical example, a triangular distribution for the variable ˜R, between the two extreme values
(Rmin, Rmax), has been assumed.
11. See also Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988] or Alonso [1996].
12. As already mentioned in the introduction, the main purpose of this paper is to show that Allen and Gale’s
result is not robust, that is, bank runs can never achieve optimal risk sharing if a more general preference
structure is introduced in their paper. For this purpose, all the assumptions of their model (except for the corner
preference one) are maintained, and in particular, the same specification for the bank’s contract is considered:
a standard contract that gives depositors fixed payments at each date.
13. See Appendix A for a detailed calculation of these constraints.
14. It is shown in Appendix C that the critical value is when r < 1.
15. Unlike Allen and Gale [1998], who exhaust the liquid asset among depositors, whenever a run takes place,
we leave open the possibility of not exhausting first period resources, even if a run occurs. This could be
interpreted as a suspension of convertibility policy.
16. It should be noticed that in Allen and Gale’s case r1 = t1mt2m = 0 as µ =
1−ρ
ρ
= 0 and therefore bank runs are
always partial.
17. It should be mentioned that the suspension policy is state contingent, as it relies on the realization of R.
18. Notice that as 0 ≤ µ < 1, we have that µ ≤ c
∗
11(R)
c∗21(R)
= 1
µ
and µ ≤ c
∗
22(R)
c∗12(R)
= 1
µ
. This means that: c∗21 (R) =
µc∗11(R)and c∗22 = c∗11(R). Similarly, c∗11 (R) = µc∗11(R)and c∗12 (R) = c∗11(R).
19. This means that: c∗21 (R) = 1+µr1+µ c∗11(R)µ and c∗22 (R) = 1+µr1+µ c∗11(R) if r ≤ 1/µ2. Otherwise, c∗21 (R) = c∗11(R)
and c∗22 (R) = µrc∗11(R). Similarly, as r > 1 we have that µ < c22c12 =
r
µ
c∗11 (R) = µc∗11(R) and c∗111(R) =
rc∗11(R).
20. In solving this maximization problem, the expected utility and the incentive constraints have been divided
by ρ.
21. The above solution could be obtained straightforward by assuming that in this case the utilities of both
types of agents are equal, and therefore Eq. (62) can be substituted by the following one: max {E
˜R[(t1 +
α)U 1(c11(R), c21(R), ρ1) + (t2 − α)U 2(c12(R)), c22(R), ρ2)]} that together with constraints (66) and the
incentive compatibility conditions (63e) and (63f) represents the first best problem (Case 2), where t1 and
t2 have been substituted by t1 + α and t2 − α, respectively. The solution to this case is given by Eq. (42),
modifying t1m , t2m and r by the new values tα1m , t
α
2m and rα, as given by formulae (33) and (34). In order for
this solution to fulfill the incentive compatibility conditions rα = 1, i.e., rα = R (k2/k1)(tα2m/tα1m ) = 1 and from this
equation the value of α(R) is derived and coincides with the one given by Eq. (88). Also the consumption
levels coincide with the first best case.
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